Assume a fully loaded out post Cold War 1992 CVBG vs a 2012 standard CSG. 1990s CVBG to consist of: CVN-65 USS Enterprise: Fully Loaded with a full airwing: 2 squadrons of F-14Ds, 3 squadrons of F/A-18C/D Hornets, 1 squadron A-6 Intruders, and 1 squadron S-3 Vikings, along with all the assorted support aircraft you’d expect for the 1990s. 2 Virginia Class CGN 2 Ticonderago Class Cruisers VLS 1 Arleigh Burke Destroyers 4 Spruance Class Destroyers 2 Perry Class Frigates 2 688I LA Class Submarines vs. 2012 Carrier Strike Group CVN-76 (24 F/A-18C s, 12 F/A-18F's, 12 F/A-18E's, 4 EA-6B's and 4 E-2's) 2 Ticonderago Class Cruisers VLS 3 Arleigh Burke Destroyers 2 Perry Class Frigates 1 Virginia Class SSN Scenario One: They both start 1000 miles away from each other and then must seek out and sink the other group. Scenario Two: Start 1000 miles away from each other. Group 1990 gains a typical ARG and a Iowa BB with her SAG. Group 2012 gains a typical modern ARG. They both have to make a landing on Ascension Island. Each side already has 1,000 light infantry troops on the island already engaged in combat. Neither side controls the airfields and can not take them until more troops are landed. Both sides intend to fly in land based aircraft via tanker support once they take the airfield. In both scenarios they have the same number of support ships they would have for their period. What happens in each case?
It probably would be most helpful for a fully informed debate without wasting time questioning this issue for you to specify a precise year since "1990's"could potentially be anywhere from 1990 to at least 1997 given the OP details, and that actually could make a substantial difference in how a couple key elements of the 1990s OP are evaluated. Edit: Upon review the Iowa Class battleship detail in scenario 2 suggests 1992 or earlier, but it probably would be best to be clear on the exact date, especially since several of the ships were ready for potential reactivation after this point.
What't the CVN-76's Air wing composition and numbers? Right now it' has no air assets attached to it, but during it's last cruise it had 24 F/A-18C s, 12 F/A-18F's, 12 F/A-18E's, 4 EA-6B's and 4 E-2's. Note no F-35's or EA-18's none were available and the F-35 will probably still not be available she is next deployed. Historically Enterprise had 2 F-14A, 2 F/A-18A's and an A-6 squadron In 94 she had 1 F-14 squadron and 3 F/A-18 squadron before loosing the F-14's and gaining a 4th F/A-18 squadron. The airwing you have in the op is similar to the one on board CVN-70 in 96 though in that case there were 2 F-14D squadrons, 2 F/A-18C squadrons and an A-6E squadron. Sortie rates being what they were, CV-65 in the OP will have an F-14 and 2 F/A-18's in the air at any given time vs 2 F/A-18s from the CVN-76. It can also launch an S-3 every 65 minutes to provide tanker support for the F/A-18s something the CVN-70 air wing does not have.
In 1992, the A-6 was still embarked, reducing the number of F-14 and F/A-18 able to be carried. Biggest factor will be that the 2012 group will know every electronic warfare trick of the 1992 group.
Given the OP has apparently effectively confirmed 1992, I'm going with most likely the 2012 force but its almost certainly going to be very ugly. On top of every electronic trick, another particularly significant detail is as of 1992 the U.S. Navy did not have the AMRAAM deployed yet, so they are going to be confined to the AIM-7M Sparrow for their missile in that category. This means that in this category the 1992 force is stuck with far less effective missile which is also going to be considerably out ranged by the AMRAAM. While the F-14's Phoenix Missiles have longer ranges, the fact they were designed primarily for intercepting bombers should limit their actual degree of effectiveness against the F-18s in this scenario. In closer, the Aim-9x of the 2012 force gives them a significant range advantage in this category as well, as well as a significantly more difficult to evade missile, with the F-18 Superhornets also able to take advantage of their helmet mounted sights to shoot the missiles from all sorts of different angles. The 2012 force should get enough of an aerial edge that they should be able to ensure victory for the 2012 force, although in scenario 1 other naval elements might have to close on their own to sink a portion of the remainder of the 1992 group given the degree the 2012 force may be limited by their loses here. (In scenario 2 the aerial force should be able to do enough damage to ensure the 2012 side's victory with regards to the island battle.) It should be noted that ordinance advantages apply in other categories as well, although it should not be as dramatic as the example above.
Don't forget that the SM-6 missile can be controlled by E-2D and probably F/A-18E/F. The SM-6 started production in 2009 and in service in 2011 As far the Virginia class, the MK-48 has been upgraded since 1992
Very true. The AIM-9X does offer a slight benefit in that it offers increased range over previous models, and ability of off boresight cued targeting.
Another factor in the A2A realm is that it's doubtful the 92 air group's radar warning receiver would even detect illumination from an AESA.
You can just edit and add items. . . . That said, the AESA can also jam the other aircraft's radar although not sure with the brute power of the AWG-9
Sorry about that. New guy here.... I'm unsure if The APG-79 has the power to jam the AWG-9 at distance. The 79 could match frequencies and send erroneous signals back to the oncoming receiver though. While not a true jam, it would be an effective spoof and lure. Assuming launch at the erroneous signal, a mission kill is possible.
The APG-79 might not have the brute power but the APY-9 very well might or it could be used to spoof the APS-139 radar system Could it actually trick the E-2C into sending the 1992 aircraft on the wrong vector
Does demonstrate that there is a lot of potential for new ECM / ECCM I suspect that the E-2 will have an easy time spoofing the AIM-54
I don't disagree about the E-2s being targeted in particular, although my point was how the AMRAAM in particular gave the 2012 a measurable advantage in the BVR phase of combat here given the AIM-54s limitations against fighters, with what happens to the each side's fighters being a huge factor in the outcome of this scenario. (AMRAAMs incidentally could also certainly successfully shoot down harpoon missiles if it became necessary.)
The Phoenix was not designed to counter anti-ship missiles. The flight profile of the 54 is all wrong for interception of a supersonic sea skimmer. Now, for it's designed purpose in downing Bears, Badgers, and Backfires it is excellent. Use of the 54 against an E-2 would work, assuming the E-2 doesn't manage to spoof and the Tomcats manage to close on the Hawkeye. The potential for ECM moving forward is incredible. I can't wait to see how the NGJ stacks up.
A AIM-54, how about 24 or 36? The E-2 would have about 16 minutes from the time it sees the F-14's in a zoom climb to missile launch, then about 75 seconds to missile impact.
The easy answer to negating the 54 is using one of its designed functions against it. A vulnerability the 2012 air wing would know. The 54 was designed with a home on jam function, to deal with severe jamming. Knowing this, you can either use a squadron with powered jammers to play a high takes game of chicken, or you use either the MALD-J or ITALD system. Yes, I am aware the Navy does not currently have MALD-J in fleet service as of yet. As the Ford also is not in service, I felt it safe to include.
